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INTRODUCTION 
Prisoners love to file habeas petitions. Maybe a little too much. That is why 
Congress drafted the federal habeas statutes to preclude prisoners from filing 
“second or successive” petitions attacking their judgments.1 But in drafting those 
statutes, Congress left open a loophole: if a prisoner secures some change to his 
judgment that makes that judgment “new,” the next petition he files challenging 
it is not second or successive, even if it raises claims that the prisoner had an 
opportunity to raise before.2 So, if a prisoner has previously filed one or more 
petitions, a court trying to determine if the current petition is second or 
successive must first determine if the prisoner is challenging a “new judgment.” 
In other words, determining whether a prisoner has obtained a new judgment is 
central to determining the availability of relief under the federal habeas statutes. 
Currently, lower courts are divided on how to make that determination. All 
agree that being re-sentenced creates a new judgment, because that is what the 
Supreme Court found in Magwood v. Patterson.3 But they frequently disagree 
on what other types of changes satisfy the new judgment requirement. This 
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 1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2255 (2012). 
 2. See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 341–42 (2010), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/561/320. 
 3. Id. at 331. 
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matters because the question arises in multiple contexts, and because, in almost 
every circuit to address the issue, once a prisoner obtains a new judgment he can 
challenge the entire judgment (not just the parts that changed) through a new 
petition. This means that for both prisoners and the courts in which they file, the 
stakes regarding the meaning of new judgment are high. 
This essay explains the shortcomings of how some courts have assessed 
that meaning, and it proposes a straightforward test for determining when a new 
judgment exists. Part I starts by addressing the parameters of the Supreme 
Court’s Magwood decision, including the confusion and disagreement it has 
engendered. Since Magwood, courts have been reaching conflicting outcomes 
on identical questions because they have little guidance on what new judgment 
means. Part II begins providing that guidance by explaining where some of those 
courts have gone wrong. Whether disregarding how the Supreme Court has 
defined “judgment,” incorrectly separating judgments into their component 
parts, or wrongly emphasizing a “custody” requirement, these courts are 
unnecessarily complicating the new-judgment analysis. To avoid these 
complications, Part III provides a straightforward new-judgment test. In 
particular, it explains that a “judgment” has two parts—the sentence and the 
conviction—and that a material change to either is enough to show that a prisoner 
has a new judgment. That basic analysis is consistent with both the text of the 
federal habeas statutes and the Supreme Court precedent interpreting them, 
making it the most justifiable means for determining whether a judgment is 
“new” and, therefore, whether a prisoner’s petition is second or successive. 
I. 
THE POST-MAGWOOD HAZE. 
Billy Joe Magwood was convicted of killing an Alabama sheriff and 
sentenced to death.4 After exhausting his state court remedies, he filed a habeas 
petition in federal district court, ultimately convincing the district court to vacate 
his death sentence and remand for resentencing.5 On remand, though, the state 
court again gave him a death sentence.6 So Magwood filed another federal 
habeas petition challenging his sentence, which the district court again granted.7 
This time, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the petition was 
second or successive because Magwood’s sentence had not changed and because 
his petition raised a claim against it that he had a chance to raise before. 8 As a 
result, Magwood petitioned the Supreme Court to grant review, arguing that his 
petition was not successive under the plain text of the federal habeas statutes.9 
 
 4. Id. at 323. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 323, 329. 
 9. Id. at 331. 
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Section 2244 of those statutes says that a “claim presented in a second or 
successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in 
a prior application shall be dismissed.”10 Section 2254 then says that district 
courts can entertain a petition from someone who is “in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”11 When interpreting 
this language in Magwood, the Supreme Court found that “second or successive” 
modified “application” and that an “application” challenged a “judgment,” 
meaning that an application challenging a “new judgment” could not be second 
or successive.12 According to the Court, the presence of a new judgment is 
“dispositive” in the second-or-successive analysis, meaning that any application 
challenging a new judgment is not second or successive “at all” (even if it raises 
claims that were, or could have been, raised before).13 
But the Court did not explain, exactly, what “new judgment” means. It 
simply said that the re-sentencing in that case was, in fact, a new judgment.14 
Since then, lower court opinions have varied widely on what satisfies this new-
judgment requirement. All seem to agree that clerical changes do not.15 But they 
seem to disagree on almost everything else. For example, they have been unable 
to agree on: whether only a re-sentencing can create a new judgment;16 whether 
a change to one count in a multi-count conviction creates a “partially new” 
judgment that limits the claims a prisoner can raise;17 whether eliminating a 
chemical castration requirement creates a new judgment;18 whether adding a 
 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012) (emphasis added). Section 2255 does not include Section 2254’s 
“judgment” language. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). Yet the courts of appeals apply Magwood’s judgment-
based approach in Section 2255 cases, too. See In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585, 586–88 (5th Cir. 2012), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/11-30458/11-30458-cv0.wpd-2012-01-
11.html; Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 2010), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-3046/10-3046-op_opn-2011-03-27.html. So 
how courts define “judgment” will affect the scope of relief under both Sections 2254 and 2255. See id. 
 12. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341–42. 
 13. Id. at 338, 341–42. 
 14. Id. at 323–24. 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 558 Fed. App’x 936, 941 n.6 (11th Cir. 2014), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-16202/12-16202-2014-03-11.html; In re 
Martin, 398 Fed. App’x 326, 327 (10th Cir. 2010), https://casetext.com/case/in-re-martin-35. 
 16. Compare Lampton, 667 F.3d at 588 (finding that whether a new judgment exists “depends 
on whether a new sentence has been imposed”), with Johnson, 623 F.3d at 42–43, 46 (finding a new 
judgment even though the prisoner’s sentence had not changed). 
 17. Compare Turner v. Brown, 845 F.3d 294, 298–99 (7th Cir. 2017), 
https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-1592/702911354 (finding, for purposes of 
the second-or-successive analysis, that judgments can be divided into component parts and that a new 
application can challenge only the parts that changed), with In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 142–43 (4th Cir. 
2017), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/16-433/16-433-2017-02-28.html 
(finding that a new judgment allows the prisoner to challenge the entire judgment, not just its changed 
parts). 
 18. An Eleventh Circuit panel found that eliminating a chemical castration requirement from a 
sentence created a new judgment. Patterson v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson I), 812 F.3d 885, 
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post-release control requirement creates a new judgment;19 and whether 
changing a prisoner’s restitution obligation creates a new judgment.20 In other 
words, the new judgment question arises in numerous contexts, and right now 
courts have been unable to agree on a principled way to answer it. 
This inability to agree matters because it affects the scope of relief that is 
available under the federal habeas statutes. Any court attempting to apply 
Magwood’s ruling—i.e., that an application challenging a new judgment is not 
second or successive at all—must first confront the question of what new 
judgment means. Put differently, they must first decide how significant the 
change to a judgment must be to make the judgment “new,” and the conclusion 
they reach will determine whether a prisoner can have another opportunity to 
challenge his confinement. This requires courts to consider the degree, if any, to 
which Congress’s desire to limit habeas applications matters, and it raises 
questions regarding the judicial system’s role in stemming those applications. In 
other words, it is a complicated question. Without guidance, courts will continue 
to disagree on how to answer it. Plus, prisoners will continue testing boundaries 
on what the answer to it should be. 
II. 
LOWER COURTS’ UNREASONABLE LIMITATIONS ON “NEW JUDGMENT.” 
Since Magwood, lower courts have limited what counts as a new judgment 
in three significant ways. First, some have discounted the Supreme Court’s 
decision to define “judgment” to include the sentence and the conviction, 
limiting prisoners to having a new judgment only when they obtain a new 
sentence. Second, some have found that multi-count judgments can be broken 
into component parts, limiting prisoners to challenging only the parts of their 
judgments that changed. Third, some have conflated the “custody” and “new 
judgment” requirements, unnecessarily examining whether the change to a 
prisoner’s judgment affected his “custody.” None of these limitations withstand 
scrutiny. 
 
887 (11th Cir. 2016), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-12653/12-12653-
2016-01-29.html. But the en banc court reversed, with 6 judges in the majority and 5 in the minority. 
Patterson v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr. (Patterson II), 849 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2017), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-12653/12-12653-2017-03-03.html (en 
banc). 
 19. Compare In re Carnail, No. 15-3057, at *6 (6th Cir. June 29, 2016) (unpublished) (no new 
judgment), with In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2016), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-4244/15-4244-2016-07-01.html (new 
judgment), and Fields v. Lee, No. 12-4878, 2016 WL 889788, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://casetext.com/case/fields-v-lee-1, report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-4878, 2016 WL 
879319 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016), https://casetext.com/case/fields-v-lee (same). 
 20. Compare Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 233–36 (2d Cir. 2015), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/14-1994/14-1994-2015-07-02.html (new 
judgment, in the context of a statute of limitations case), with Carrillo v. Zupan, No. 15-00376, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65240, at *3, *9 (D. Colo. May 19, 2015), https://casetext.com/case/carrillo-v-
zupan (no new judgment, in the context of a statute of limitations case). 
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A. Ignoring one of a judgment’s critical parts. 
A judgment has two parts, the sentence and the conviction. The Supreme 
Court, 21 the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,22 and the federal habeas 
forms23 are clear on this basic principle. But for purposes of the second-or-
successive analysis, some courts disregard this principle in an effort to curtail 
prisoners’ ability to file new habeas petitions. Specifically, they find that 
invalidating a conviction without changing the prisoner’s overall sentence does 
not create a new judgment. Put differently, they require a re-sentencing 
proceeding before finding that a new judgment exists. 
The Fifth Circuit, for example, recently imposed such a requirement in In 
re Lampton.24 Faced with a prisoner who had convinced a lower court to 
eliminate one count of a multi-count conviction, the court refused to find that 
this created a new judgment, even though the eliminated count carried a life 
sentence.25 The court pointed out that the prisoner was still serving a life sentence 
on one of his remaining counts, and it contrasted this with the prisoner in 
Magwood, who had been fully resentenced.26 It then found that whether a new 
judgment exists “depends on whether a new sentence has been imposed.”27 In 
other words, it limited the definition of new judgment to the facts of Magwood, 
finding that only the sentence portion of a judgment matters for purposes of the 
new-judgment analysis. 
That conclusion misses three important points. First, in Magwood, the 
Supreme Court never said that a full resentencing was necessary to create a new 
 
 21. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/508/129 (“A judgment of conviction includes both the 
adjudication of guilt and the sentence.”); see also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 151–53, 155–56 
(2007), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/549/147 (recognizing that a judgment has two parts). 
 22. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1) (“In the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, 
the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.”). 
 23. The Section 2254 and Section 2255 forms that prisoners fill out ask those prisoners to 
identify the “judgment of conviction” (i.e., the same language used in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure) that they are challenging. See Petition for Relief from a Conviction or Sentence By 
a Person in State Custody, U.S. COURTS (Jan. 1 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao241_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5WA-UWGA]; Motion to 
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody, U.S. COURTS (Jan. 1 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao243_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV3V-M9FC]. “Judgment of 
conviction” includes both the conviction and the sentence because the forms allow prisoners to raise 
challenges to either. See id.; see also DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND 
RELIEF HANDBOOK §1:1 (Thomson Reuters 2016-17) (defining “judgment of conviction” to include the 
conviction and the sentence). 
 24. 667 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2012), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/11-
30458/11-30458-cv0.wpd-2012-01-11.html. 
 25. Id. at 587–89. The Fifth Circuit did something similar in In re Hensley, 836 F.3d 504 (5th 
Cir. 2016), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-30519/16-30519-2016-09-
07.html. There, the prisoner had convinced a lower court to eliminate a habitual-offender designation 
and the increased sentence that went along with it. Hensley, 836 F.3d at 506. The court found that this, 
too, was insufficient to create a new judgment. Id. 
 26. Lampton, 667 F.3d at 589. 
 27. Id. at 587–89. 
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judgment. It simply said that a full resentencing had been performed in that case, 
emphasizing that the existence of a new judgment was “especially clear here, 
where the state court conducted a full resentencing and reviewed the aggravating 
evidence afresh.”28 So, relying on Magwood for the idea that only a resentencing 
creates a new judgment is not supported by what the Supreme Court actually 
said. 
Second, the Supreme Court has defined judgment to include both the 
sentence and the conviction.29 Concluding that only a resentencing creates a new 
judgment is inconsistent with this basic definition. Specifically, if courts create 
a new judgment when they change a sentence (even without changing the 
conviction), it follows that they create a new judgment when they change a 
conviction, too (even without changing the overall sentence).30 In both cases, a 
portion of the judgment is different than it was before. Respecting that point is 
the only way to respect the Supreme Court’s judgment definition. 
Finally, requiring a prisoner to show that he has been resentenced to satisfy 
the new-judgment analysis is misplaced because a conviction has consequences 
separate from the sentence attached to it. For example, criminal history points 
and career criminal status can be dictated by the sheer number of convictions on 
someone’s record.31 Consequently, vacating a conviction can have collateral 
effects, a point the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized.32 Those effects 
justify finding that a new judgment exists, even if vacating the conviction had no 
effect on the prisoner’s sentence. 
B. Disaggregating judgments by examining the claims raised. 
When the Supreme Court decided Magwood, it left open a question that has 
subsequently divided the courts of appeals: whether prisoners who convince a 
lower court to change part of their judgment are limited to challenging the 
changed part. Most have found that they are not.33 But two, the Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits, have decided that under these circumstances the prisoner has 
 
 28. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 339, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/561/320. 
 29. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/508/129. 
 30. See Johnson, 623 F.3d at 42–43. 
 31. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.2(f), 4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/GLMFull.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UNM5-DKNC]; see also United States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 
2015), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/13-15874/13-15874-2015-03-17-
0.html (discussing the history of the Eleventh Circuit counting convictions with sentencing withheld as 
convictions for federal statutes). 
 32. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/856/case.html (vacating an impermissible conviction 
that did not affect the prisoner’s sentence, and remanding for the district court to enter a new “judgment,” 
because such a conviction still “has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored”). 
One of the “collateral consequences” that the Supreme Court gave as an example was that the conviction 
could “result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense.” Id. 
 33. Gray, 850 F.3d at 142–43 (describing the circuit split). 
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obtained only a partially new judgment, which limits him to challenging the part 
that was changed.34 That approach is mistaken for several reasons. 
First, the federal habeas statutes speak of only one “judgment.”35 In other 
words, they contemplate a prisoner challenging a unitary judgment, not a 
prisoner challenging a judgment’s component parts. This is because only one 
“judgment of conviction” arises from each case, even if a defendant is convicted 
on multiple counts. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for example, 
explain that the “judgment of conviction” is a single document filed by the court 
at the end of a criminal trial that includes “the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s 
findings, the adjudication, and the sentence.”36 This necessarily means that a 
change to part of the “judgment of conviction” changes the whole thing. Put 
differently, changing part of a judgment does not create a “partially new 
judgment.” It creates a single judgment that is totally new. Finding otherwise is 
inconsistent with the text of the federal habeas statutes and the commonly 
understood meaning of “judgment of conviction.” 
Second, finding that a prisoner has obtained a partially new judgment is the 
same as adopting the claims-based approach that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Magwood.37 Consider, for example, a prisoner who obtains a change to part of 
his judgment, then files a new habeas application that includes claims 
challenging both the changed and unchanged parts. Courts taking the “partially 
new judgment” approach would have to examine the application to see which 
claims were successive and which were not. In Magwood, the State asked the 
Supreme Court to do the same thing, but the Court chose not to. It recognized 
that the federal habeas statutes require courts to determine whether the 
“application” is second or successive.38 If it is, only then do courts review the 
application on a claim-by-claim basis under Sections 2244(b)(1) and 2244(b)(2) 
to see if any individual claim may proceed.39 Put differently, Section 2244 
requires courts to determine whether the petition “as a whole” is successive 
before they can examine the petition’s individual claims.40 That means that if a 
petition is the first to challenge a changed judgment, courts should not treat any 
 
 34. See Turner v. Brown, 845 F.3d at 298–99; Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 285 (7th 
Cir. 2013); Burks v. Raemisch, No. 16-1247, 2017 WL 727132 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 2017), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/16-1247/16-1247-2017-02-24.html 
(unpublished) (finding, in the context of Section 2244(d)(1)(A), that the statute of limitations was not 
reset after a resentencing for claims unrelated to the resentencing). 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
 36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1); see also WILKES, STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND 
RELIEF HANDBOOK § 1:1 (same). Rule 32 also states that the judge “must sign the judgment, and the 
clerk must enter it.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Monsanto, 
491 U.S. 600, 602, 605 n.4 (1989), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/491/600 (referring to “a 
judgment of conviction” where the defendant was convicted of, and sentenced under, multiple counts) 
(emphasis added)). 
 37. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 331–33. 
 38. See id. at 334–35; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2012). 
 39. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(1),(2). 
 40. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 334–35 n.10; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(1),(2). 
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claims within it as successive, even if they challenge the unchanged parts.41 In 
other words, it means there is no such thing as a “partially new judgment” when 
determining whether a petition is successive.42 
Finally, the “partially new judgment” approach is impractical and 
inefficient. Consider, again, the prisoner who obtains a change to part of his 
judgment. Determining whether the claims he raises in a new application 
challenge the changed or the unchanged parts of that judgment will sometimes 
be “no easy feat.”43 Plus, if some of those claims did, in fact, challenge the 
unchanged parts, the district court would have to transfer those claims to the 
court of appeals for authorization under Section 2244.44 Then it would have to 
wait on the court of appeals’ response.45 That would be inconsistent with one of 
the “basic purposes” of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA): “to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process.”46 
C. Conflating the “new judgment” and “custody” requirements. 
The federal habeas statutes require courts to consider habeas applications 
from prisoners who are “in custody” pursuant to a “judgment” if the judgment 
allegedly violates the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.47 
At least one court, the Eleventh Circuit, has started relying on the “custody” 
language in these provisions to limit the scope of what “new judgment” means. 
In Cox v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, for example, the 
prisoner had a three-count conviction, with the third count carrying a suspended 
sentence.48 After unsuccessfully filing a first habeas petition in federal court, the 
prisoner convinced a state court to eliminate count three on double jeopardy 
 
 41. See, e.g., Gray, 850 F.3d at 143–44; King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 2015), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-4189/13-4189-2015-12-01.html. 
 42. Reading the federal habeas statutes to mean that a prisoner cannot have a “partially new 
judgment” also is consistent with Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/531/4. There, the State argued that parts of a habeas 
application might be “properly filed” under Section 2244(d) while other parts might not. Bennett, 531 
U.S. at 9–10. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, explaining that Section 2244(d) “refers only 
to ‘properly filed’ applications and does not contain the peculiar suggestion that a single application can 
be both ‘properly filed’ and not ‘properly filed.’” Id. at 10. 
 43. King, 807 F.3d at 158. Because the sentence and conviction are often interrelated, some 
claims will challenge both. For instance, if the jury finds facts related to the conviction and the sentence, 
a Batson challenge would affect both. Id. So would a Brady challenge if the government withheld 
exculpatory evidence until after resentencing. Id. Separating these types of claims out when reviewing 
a petition filed after a new judgment would be difficult, if not impossible. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/560/631. 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). Again, although Section 2255 uses 
the word “sentence” instead of “judgment,” courts still apply Magwood’s “new judgment” rule to it. See 
supra note 11. 
 48. 837 F.3d 1114, 1115 (11th Cir. 2016), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
courts/ca11/13-15718/13-15718-2016-09-13.html. 
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grounds.49 He then filed another habeas petition in federal court and argued that 
it challenged a new judgment.50 But the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.51 It found 
that he was never “in custody” under count three.52 Put differently, the court 
decided that the prisoner had to originally be “in custody” under the part of the 
judgment that was changed for a new judgment to exist.53 
The court later took a similar step in Patterson v. Secretary, Florida 
Department of Corrections.54 There, the prisoner convinced a state court to 
eliminate a chemical castration component of his sentence.55 He then filed a new 
habeas petition and argued that this change to his sentence created a new 
judgment.56 A three-judge panel agreed,57 but the en banc court reversed, finding 
that the order eliminating his chemical castration requirement did not “authorize” 
his custody.58 In so concluding, the en banc court appeared to find that such an 
order would “authorize” custody only if it were memorialized in a new paper 
judgment or if it added something to the prisoner’s judgment.59 Put differently, 
it was not enough to invalidate some part of a prisoner’s sentence or conviction. 
Further change—in the form of issuing a new paper judgment or worsening the 
prisoner’s judgment—was necessary. 
Intermingling the “custody” and “new judgment” analyses in this way is 
wrong for two main reasons. First, doing so is inconsistent with the text of federal 
habeas statutes. In particular, the statutes’ text shows that the “custody” 
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied at the time the 
application is filed.60 This means that when someone files a petition, the district 
court looks to see if that individual is currently in custody under a judgment that 
he is challenging on constitutional (or other federal law) grounds. If so, then the 
district court has jurisdiction to consider his petition.61 Only then does the court 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1115–16. 
 53. See id. 
 54. 849 F.3d 1321. 
 55. Id. at 1323. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1324 (citing Patterson I, 812 F.3d 885. 
 58. Id. at 1325–27. In reaching this conclusion, the court appeared to reject Cox’s finding that 
the eliminated portion of the judgment had to, when it existed, hold the prisoner in custody. See id. at 
1327 (“But whether a challenge to the removed portion of the sentence was initially cognizable in a 
habeas proceeding is irrelevant to whether the removal of that condition produces a new judgment.”). 
 59. The majority’s rationale is a little unclear, as the five dissenting judges point out. See id. at 
1330–32. Also, a requirement that an order be memorialized in a new paper judgment seems difficult to 
justify. If we hinged the new judgment analysis on whether the lower court entered a new paper 
judgment, then the substantive nature of the change would no longer matter and the outcome would vary 
based on the practices of the lower courts. Id. 
 60. BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 7.3 (Thompson Reuters 2016) (“The 
custody requirement is jurisdictional. Thus, it is a preliminary issue to be decided first by the court.”). 
 61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012); see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/488 (“We have interpreted the statutory language as 
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ask whether the prisoner has previously filed a petition challenging his judgment, 
and if the answer is yes, that is when the court must determine whether the 
judgment the prisoner is challenging is “new.” In other words, the “custody” 
inquiry is entirely separate from the question of whether a prisoner is challenging 
a “new judgment.” 
Second, the Supreme Court recognized that point in Magwood. There, the 
State argued that the Court “should focus not on the statute’s reference to a 
‘judgment’ but on its reference to ‘custody’” when determining whether a 
petition is successive.62 The Court found that argument “unpersuasive,” though, 
because it was inconsistent with the text of the federal habeas statutes.63 Put 
simply, it rejected the State’s attempt to make “custody” the key issue in 
determining whether a petition is successive; it found that the “judgment” is what 
matters.64 Thus, intermingling the “custody” and “new judgment” analyses is not 
only inconsistent with the text of the federal habeas statutes, it is also inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that text—i.e., neither the text nor the 
Supreme Court endorses mixing the two. 
III. 
MATERIAL CHANGES TO SENTENCES OR CONVICTIONS CREATE NEW 
JUDGMENTS. 
So far courts have not applied any consistent test for determining when a 
new judgment exists. They have addressed each change in the “new judgment” 
cases piecemeal, without adopting any holistic analysis for figuring out what 
“new judgment” means. The remainder of this essay lays out such a test in two 
parts. First, any material change to either a sentence or a conviction should be 
sufficient to create a new judgment after Magwood. “Material” in this context 
means invalidating or adding to either part of the judgment. Second, the change 
to a prisoner’s judgment does not have to be detrimental to be material. Any 
material change, even if it helps the prisoner, creates a new judgment under this 
test. Overall, this test respects the federal habeas statutes’ text and simplifies the 
analysis for a question that has plagued, and divided, the lower courts ever since 
the Supreme Court issued its Magwood opinion. 
A. Material means invalidate or add to. 
Because a judgment has two parts, and because material changes to either 
have consequences for a prisoner, those changes should be sufficient to create a 
 
requiring that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the 
time his petition is filed.”) (emphasis added). 
 62. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 333. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.; see also Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1331–32 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“In Magwood, the 
Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument that custody is the critical concept in determining whether 
a habeas corpus petition is second or successive. . . .”). 
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“new judgment” when analyzing whether a petition is successive after Magwood. 
This means that invalidating or adding to either part of the judgment is enough 
to make that judgment “new.” Stated differently, any non-clerical change 
affecting the validity of the underlying judgment would be a “material” change 
for purposes of determining whether a judgment is new and, therefore, whether 
a petition is successive. 
This test should be relatively easy to apply because what constitutes a 
clerical change has been well defined by state and federal courts. For example, 
it is universally accepted that clerical changes are ministerial changes, such as 
those that conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement or those that 
correct dates.65 And it is universally accepted that clerical changes do not include 
any “substantive alteration”—that is, changes resulting from “a judicial 
determination or error” or changes affecting the “validity” of a sentence or 
conviction.66 In essence, by hinging the outcome of the “new judgment” test on 
whether the underlying change to a prisoner’s judgment was clerical, courts 
would be able to rely on a well-developed body of state and federal case law to 
determine when a new judgment has been created. 
Admittedly, this defines new judgment somewhat broadly. Applying it 
would mean, for example, that adding a post-release control requirement to a 
prisoner’s sentence would be a new judgment,67 as would eliminating one count 
of a multi-count judgment, even if it in no way affected the prisoner’s sentence.68 
Eliminating a habitual offender designation would qualify, too.69 So would 
changing a prisoner’s restitution obligation,70 invalidating a prisoner’s chemical 
castration requirement,71 and amending a prisoner’s judgment to include earned 
good-time credit.72 In short, quite a few changes will satisfy this basic test. 
 
 65. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 3 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 641 (4th ed. 
2017). 
 66. Id.; DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 
HANDBOOK § 3:40 (Thomson Reuters 2017); United States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 816 (11th Cir. 2003), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/331/809/510947; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800 court 
commentary to 1999 amendments. 
 67. See In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2016), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/15-4244/15-4244-2016-07-01.html. 
 68. See Johnson, 623 F.3d at 42–43. 
 69. This would mean that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly decided In re Hensley, 836 F.3d 504, 506 
(5th Cir. 2016), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-30519/16-30519-2016-09-
07.html. 
 70. See Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 233–36 (2d Cir. 2015), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/14-1994/14-1994-2015-07-02.html 
(“Restitution is a serious component of criminal punishment.”). 
 71. See the original Eleventh Circuit panel opinion in Patterson I, 812 F.3d at 887. 
 72. Sorey v. Jones, No. 14-141, 2015 WL 5468671, at *2–4 (N.D. Fla. May 25, 2015) (finding 
a new judgment because it added one day of good-time credit), report and recommendation 
adopted, No. 14-141, 2015 WL 5468651 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2015), https://casetext.com/case/sorey-v-
jones; Braunstein v. Cox, No. 11-00587, 2012 WL 3638772, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Aug. 22, 2012), 
https://casetext.com/case/braunstein-v-cox-1 (finding a new judgment because it added forty days of 
good-time credit). 
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But one significant set of changes would not: sentence modifications made 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) or any equivalent state procedure.73 This is so for two 
reasons. First, these changes do not affect the validity of an underlying judgment. 
Instead, they modify a judgment based on the result of some collateral 
proceeding, such as the Sentencing Commission’s decision to adjust a guidelines 
range. Second, with respect to changes under Section 3582, Congress included 
language in that statute regarding the effect of these modifications,74 specifying 
that a prisoner’s original judgment of conviction remains his final “judgment” 
for purposes of the second-or-successive analysis.75 Consequently, one set of 
changes that can have the most far-reaching effect for prisoners would not create 
a wave of new judgments, and therefore a wave of new petitions, under this test. 
Even after carving out these sentence modifications, though, some courts 
may be concerned about the breadth of changes that create a new judgment under 
this test. Four responses counter those concerns: First, changes that lead to “new 
judgments” under this test are, and will remain, relatively difficult to obtain. In 
particular, convincing a naturally skeptical court (usually while acting pro se) to 
change a conviction or sentence is no easy task. So any concern over creating a 
flood of new petitions would be “greatly exaggerated,” a basic point that the 
Supreme Court recognized in Magwood. 76 Second, the exhaustion doctrine and 
procedural default rules will still limit prisoners’ ability to assert abusive 
claims.77 In fact, the Supreme Court recognized in Magwood that procedural-
default rules are better suited at weeding out abusive claims than the bar on 
 
 73. Some states, for example, allow courts to reduce a sentence if it is too harsh. Doing so says 
nothing about whether the sentence is illegal or illegally imposed. See DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE 
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK § 1:7 (Thomson Reuters 2016-17). That said, at 
least one court has reached a different conclusion when applying such a law. See Clayton v. Biter, 868 
F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2017), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/15-71566/15-
71566-2017-08-21.html (“[U]nder California law, a resentencing petition does not challenge the 
underlying conviction or sentence; rather, it seeks to obtain the benefits of Proposition 36 and results in 
the entry of a new appealable order or judgment. The denial of Clayton’s section 1170.126 petition 
therefore constitutes a new judgment.”). 
 74. Specifically, Section 3582(b) says: “Notwithstanding the fact that a sentence to 
imprisonment can subsequently be . . . modified pursuant to the provisions of subsection (c) . . . a 
judgment of conviction that includes such a sentence constitutes a final judgment for all other purposes.” 
In other words, Congress stated its intent in Section 3582(b) regarding the effect of these collateral 
changes on the finality of a prisoner’s judgment, something it did not do in the federal habeas statutes 
regarding the second-or-successive analysis. 
 75. So far three courts of appeals have agreed that the language included by Congress precludes 
these modifications from creating “new judgments.” See, e.g., Sherrod v. United States, 858 F.3d 1240, 
1242 (9th Cir. 2017), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/16-72178/16-72178-
2017-06-02.html (“[W]e join our sister circuits in holding that a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction does 
not qualify as a new, intervening judgment.”). 
 76. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 340. 
 77. See King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 160 (6th Cir. 2015), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-4189/13-4189-2015-12-01.html; Insignares 
v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corrs., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 n.9 (11th Cir. 2014), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-12378/12-12378-2014-06-23.html. 
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second-or-successive petitions.78 Hence, those rules should be the primary 
means for discouraging abusive claims, not a new-judgment rule that stretches 
the second-or-successive bar beyond what the text of the federal habeas statutes 
supports. Third, if a federal court has already addressed the merits of a claim in 
the first round of habeas review, that claim will not take long to decide if a 
prisoner raises it again. The court can summarily dismiss it without having to re-
engage the arguments for doing so.79 Thus, any fear that prisoners would be able 
to re-litigate the merits of claims that were already decided would be unjustified. 
Finally, if a valid concern exists over prisoners’ ability to raise claims in new 
petitions, Congress is the appropriate avenue for addressing that concern. It could 
easily add language to the federal habeas statutes limiting prisoners’ ability to 
file new petitions after obtaining changes to their judgments. It could, for 
example, limit them to challenging the parts of their judgments that changed. Or 
it could preclude them from raising claims that they raised, or could have raised, 
before. Or it could do both. Or it could do something else entirely. The point is 
that if any action is necessary, clarifying the statutes in this way is the better 
action to take; disregarding the text of the federal habeas statutes, the Supreme 
Court’s guidance on the “second-or-successive” analysis, and the Supreme 
Court’s basic definition of “judgment,” is not. 
B. Material does not mean detrimental. 
One last issue needs to be addressed to explain the scope of the test 
proposed in this essay. Assume that a prisoner has secured a beneficial change 
to his judgment. Maybe, for example, the change reduced his sentence. Or maybe 
it eliminated a conviction from his record but his overall sentence did not change. 
Either way, this would be a material change that creates a new judgment and 
allows him to file a new habeas petition. It does not matter that the change was 
to his advantage. 
On its face, allowing a prisoner to file a new petition challenging his 
improved judgment seems counterintuitive. Some courts have hinted as much.80 
But the Supreme Court has found the distinction immaterial. In Burton v. 
 
 78. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 340; see also Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 
2012), http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/10-16605/10-16605-2012-04-02.html 
(“The Supreme Court’s discussion in Magwood indicates that procedural default rules—rather than the 
rules governing ‘second or successive’ petitions—are the more appropriate tools for sorting out new 
claims from the old.”). 
 79. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 340 n.15 (“It will not take a court long to dispose of such claims 
where the court has already analyzed the legal issues.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 2017 WL 727132, at *5 (finding that the prisoner did not have 
a new judgment for purposes of resetting the statute of limitations clock, in part because his resentencing 
“resulted in a more favorable sentence”). The en banc Eleventh Circuit expressly asked the parties to 
brief this question in Patterson. See Patterson II, 849 F.3d at 1328. It then adopted a new–judgment test 
focusing on whether a change authorized the prisoner’s confinement. Id. at 1324–29. From the court’s 
opinion, it appears that the only ways to satisfy that test would be to secure a new paper judgment or to 
show that the change was detrimental to the prisoner. See id. at 1324–26, 1329–33. 
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Stewart, for example, the Court examined whether the prisoner’s petition was 
second or successive and determined that it was because it challenged the same 
judgment as his prior petition.81 In reaching that conclusion, it did not matter that 
the “judgment” was one that had been amended to the prisoner’s benefit.82 In 
fact, in finding that the prisoner’s petition was successive, the Court negatively 
compared it to the petition in In re Taylor out of the Fourth Circuit.83 There, the 
prisoner had convinced a court to eliminate three counts and sixty months from 
his judgment.84 Then he filed a numerically second petition.85 This, according to 
the Supreme Court, was an example of a case with a “new judgment intervening 
between the two habeas petitions.”86 The fact that the new judgment had helped 
the prisoner did not matter. 
That lack of regard for whether the intervening judgment helped or harmed 
the prisoner is consistent with the Court’s subsequent opinion in Magwood, as 
well. There, the prisoner had convinced a federal district court to vacate his death 
sentence and order a resentencing.87 At the resentencing, though, he was again 
given the death penalty.88 Thus, his sentence did not change. Yet, when he 
challenged this new sentence through a new habeas petition, the Supreme Court 
found that the petition was not second or successive because it challenged a new 
judgment.89 In other words, the change’s lack of detriment to the prisoner did not 
prevent the Court from finding that the change created a new judgment for 
purposes of the second or successive analysis. 
While this may seem counterintuitive, it has support in the text of the 
federal habeas statutes. Specifically, they speak only of the “judgment” and they 
include no qualifiers as to whether that judgment, if changed, has put the prisoner 
in a better or worse position.90 That is, they provide no textual support for 
examining how the change to a judgment affected the prisoner. So it is unclear 
why any court in performing the new-judgment analysis would focus on whether 
a change to a prisoner’s judgment helped or harmed him. The only question is 
whether the judgment has materially changed. If it has, a new judgment exists, 
period. That is the only result that is consistent with Burton, Magwood, and the 
statutes’ text. 
 
 81. 549 U.S. 147, 155–56 (2007), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/549/147. 
 82. Id. at 150–51 (explaining that the March 16, 1998 amended judgment increased the 
prisoner’s good time credits). 
 83. Id. at 156 (citing In Re Taylor, 171 F.3d 185 (4th Cir. 1999)), 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/171/185/557561). 
 84. Taylor, 171 F.3d at 186–87 
 85. Id. 
 86. Burton, 549 U.S. at 156. 
 87. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 323, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/561/320. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 341–42. 
 90. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2255 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
The meaning of “new judgment” is controversial because defining it 
broadly increases a prisoner’s ability to file new habeas petitions, including 
petitions raising claims that the prisoner has raised, or could have raised, before. 
Courts are understandably wary of that result. But that is the result that Magwood 
and the language of the federal habeas statutes require. If courts want that to 
change, Congress is the appropriate venue for changing it. Stretching the 
statutes’ language, or disregarding how the Supreme Court has interpreted that 
language, as a means to preclude prisoners’ petitions is not. Until Congress acts, 
the most justifiable way to address the new judgment question is to ask whether 
a court has invalidated part of, or added to, a prisoner’s sentence or conviction. 
If so, then his judgment is new and the first petition filed after it is not second or 
successive “at all.” That is consistent with Magwood and the text of the federal 
habeas statutes, and that is what courts should require when examining whether 
a new judgment exists. 
